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#2A-l/28/88 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
HYDE PARK CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT UNIT, 
DUTCHESS COUNTY EDUCATIONAL LOCAL #867. 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION. 
AFSCME. AFL-CIO, LOCAL 1000. 
Charging Party. 
-and- CASE NO. U-9058 
HYDE PARK CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT. 
Respondent. 
MARJORIE E. KAROWE. ESQ.. for Charging Party 
DAVID SHAW. ESQ.. for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Hyde 
Park Central School District (District) to the decision of 
the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) finding that the District 
violated §209-a.l(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment 
Act (Act) when it assigned certain supervisory duties of Head 
Maintenance Mechanic (HMM). a title within the negotiating 
unit represented by the charging party, Hyde Park Central 
School District Unit. Dutchess County Educational Local #867, 
Civil Service Employees Association. AFSCME. AFL-CIO. Local 
1000 (CSEA), to a newly created title of Assistant Supervisor 
of Buildings and Grounds (ASBG). a position not in the unit. 
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CSEA also filed a petition for unit clarification/unit 
placement seeking a determination that the position of ASBG 
was or should be in the unit represented by CSEA. That 
matter was consolidated for hearing with this case. The 
Director has issued a decision on the petition— finding 
that the ASBG is not in the unit represented by CSEA and is 
not appropriately placed in that unit. No exceptions have 
been taken to the Director's decision. The Director's 
factual findings and conclusions were adopted by the ALJ for 
the purposes of this case. 
FACTS 
After Kilmer, the HMM. retired, the District left the 
unit position vacant, created the new title of ASBG, which it 
treated as a nonunit position, and hired Martin to fill the 
position. The District had previously sought through 
negotiations to remove the HMM from the unit but withdrew the 
proposal after CSEA objected. The District, at that time, 
believed the HMM performed sufficient supervisory duties to 
warrant removal. 
The HMM assigned daily work to grounds and maintenance 
personnel and daily oversaw their work at their job sites. 
He performed these functions under the direct supervision of 
the Supervisor of Buildings and Grounds, who reviewed the 
daily assignments and also periodically worked alongside unit 
1/Hvde Park CSD, 20 PEEB 1f4069 (1987). 11414 
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employees. He had no responsibilities regarding formal 
evaluations nor did he initiate discipline. 
Mayen. the Supervisor of Buildings and Grounds, 
testified that prior to Kilmer's retirement, he had asked for 
the creation of an Assistant Supervisor title to help him 
with the supervision of unit employees and with his 
administrative duties. The District's buildings and grounds 
department consists of 53 unit employees, 15 of which are 
grounds and maintenance personnel, the remainder being 
custodial titles. 
The ASBG, unlike the HMM. oversees all 53 employees in 
the buildings and grounds department. On a daily basis, he 
assigns work to the grounds and maintenance personnel and 
visits their job sites to observe the progress of their 
work. He also performs similar functions for custodial 
employees, but on a much less frequent basis because of their 
more routine assignments. The ASBG can assign overtime on 
his own, unlike the HMM. Further, unlike the HMM. the ASBG's 
duties include written evaluation of all department employees 
and the documentation of disciplinary matters. He will also 
be involved in the preparation of the department's budget. 
In general, the ASBG has all the authority of the Supervisor 
and is to assist the Supervisor in all areas. 
DIRECTOR'S DECISION 
The Director found that the ASBG does not perform the 
same job function as the former HMM. The new position has 
11415 
Board - U-9058 -4 
department-wide duties, while the HMM acted only over a 
limited portion of the department. Furthermore, the ASBG's 
supervisory role "vastly exceeds" the HMM's supervisory 
functions. He determined that the ASBG's duties of 
discipline and budget preparation, and the assumption of the 
Supervisor's authority do not warrant placing that position 
in CSEA's unit. 
ALJ'S DECISION 
The ALJ noted that the Director's decision, determining 
that the ASBG is not within and is not appropriately placed 
within CSEA's unit, does not resolve the instant charge. The 
issue raised by the charge is whether the assignment of work 
previously performed by the HMM to the ASBG violated the 
Act. The ALJ concluded that the assignment of daily work to 
the grounds and maintenance personnel and the daily oversight 
of their job performance at the work site were the exclusive 
functions of the HMM, a unit position. The Supervisor's 
authority and the occasional performance of work alongside 
unit employees does not call into question the exclusivity of 
the HMM's assignment and supervisory duties. The ALJ further 
found that these duties of the HMM are now performed by the 
ASBG and that such duties are substantially the same duties 
as were performed by the HMM. The ALJ further concluded 
that, insofar as the at-issue duties are concerned, there was 
no significant change in job qualifications. There was no 
change in the daily assignment and daily supervisory 
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functions or in the manner in which they are performed. The 
ALJ concluded, therefore, that no further balancing test need 
be applied and determined that the District violated 
§209-a.l(d) of the Act by unilaterally assigning unit work to 
a nonunit employee. The ALJ directed that the District 
reinstate the duties of daily assignment and daily 
supervision of grounds and maintenance personnel previously 
performed by the HMM to the unit represented by CSEA. 
DISTRICT'S EXCEPTIONS 
The District urges that it was error to find that the 
daily supervisory work assigned to the ASBG was exclusive 
unit work. In the District's view, the supervisory duties of 
the HMM cannot be considered exclusive unit work. It relies 
on job descriptions of other nonunit titles, which show that 
daily supervision could be performed by such employees. In 
addition, the District relies on the fact that the 
supervisory duties of the HMM were under the direct 
supervision and control of the Supervisor, who made a daily 
review of assignments. 
The District also claims error in the finding that there 
was no significant change in the qualifications for the job 
of supervision. It urges that the qualifications for the HMM 
and ASBG positions are distinguishable and that it was 
inappropriate to look solely at the HMM's functions when 
evaluating the effect of the change in qualifications. It 
points out that the Director has found that the ASBG does not 
perform the same job function as the HMM. 
11417 
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Finally, the District urges that "for reasons of public 
policy", this Board should not hold that an employer, having 
once given minimal supervisory powers to unit members, cannot 
withdraw such supervision or redeploy the supervisory system 
so as to best carry out the mission of the employer. 
CSEA. in response, urges that the record supports the 
ALJ's conclusion that the HMM's supervisory duties were 
exclusive unit work, now performed by the ASBG, and that a 
balancing test is not needed since there was no significant 
change in the qualifications for performing the at-issue 
duties. CSEA also argues that there is no basis for the 
District's "public policy" argument. 
DISCUSSION 
In applying the test set forth by us in Niagara Frontier 
2/ Transportation Authority.— it is ordinarily appropriate to 
focus on the specific job functions or duties of the unit 
position which are in issue, as the ALJ did in this case. 
However, this case is the first one presented to us in which 
the at-issue duties are supervisory in nature. We conclude 
that some weight must be accorded the public employer's right 
to alter or redeploy its supervisory responsibilities, at 
least to the extent of not considering the unit position's 
supervisory duties in isolation from the supervisory system 
established by the employer. 
l/l8 PERB 1P083 (1985). 
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The duties at issue in this case are the HMM's 
responsibilities relating to the daily assignment and daily 
work site supervision of grounds and maintenance personnel, a 
relatively small group of employees. The District has 
incorporated these responsibilities in the job duties of the 
new position of ASBG. The ASBG position was established to 
assist the Supervisor in the performance of his duties. The 
position requires different overall qualifications than those 
for the HMM. The Director has found that the ASBG's 
department-wide supervisory role vastly exceeds the HMM's 
supervisory duties. He found that the ASBG is a significantly 
different position than the HMM, and that the position does not 
perform the same job functions as the HMM. His findings are 
not challenged. 
The HMM's at-issue duties were under the direct 
supervision and control of the Supervisor, who made a daily 
review of assignments. The Supervisor often appeared at the 
job site to oversee the work and occasionally performed work 
alongside unit employees. We find that the supervisory duties 
of the HMM were not performed exclusively by him, but rather 
were part of a relatively small operation in which supervisory 
duties were shared by unit and nonunit employees. 
We also find that the supervisory tasks of the ASBG are 
not substantially similar to those previously performed by 
the HMM. While the ASBG makes daily assignments and oversees 
job site work, his responsibilities in this regard are 
11419 
Board - U-9058 -8 
significantly different than the HMM's, since the ASBG 
possesses formal evaluation and disciplinary authority and 
can be expected to work more independently by virtue of his 
greater authority. 
As we stated in Niagara Frontier Transportation 
Authority, in determining whether there has been an improper 
unilateral transfer of unit work, the initial essential 
questions are: 1) whether the at-issue work had been 
performed exclusively by unit employees and 2) whether the 
reassigned tasks are substantially similar to those 
previously performed by unit employees. Inasmuch as we find 
that both of these questions must be answered in the negative 
in this case, the charge that the District violated 
§209-a.l(d) of the Act must be dismissed. 
NOW. THEREFORE. WE ORDER that the charge herein be, and 
it hereby is. in all respects dismissed. 
DATED: January 28. 1988 
New York. New York 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Memb 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ROBERT I. HARRIS and SEAN P. SHEA. 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3272 
NEW YORK STATE DIVISION OF HOUSING 
AND COMMUNITY RENEWAL. 
Employer. 
-and-
DISTRICT COUNCIL 37. AFSCME. AFL-CIO. 
Intervenor. 
ROBERT I. HARRIS. ESQ. and SEAN P. SHEA. ESQ.. pro se 
JOSEPH M. BRESS, ESQ.. for Employer 
ROBERT PEREZ-WILSON. ESQ. (LEONARD A. SHRIER. ESQ.. 
of Counsel), for Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
In this decertification- petition, Robert I. Harris 
and Sean P. Shea (petitioners) seek to decertify District 
Council 37. AFSCME. AFL-CIO (DC-37) as the representative of 
A/The petition originally filed sought certification 
as well as decertification. However, the certification 
aspect of the petition was withdrawn upon receipt of 
information from the assigned Administrative Law Judge that 
only employee organizations, and not individuals, have 
standing to file petitions for certification pursuant to 
Rules of Procedure §201.2(a). 
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a unit of approximately 536 employees of the New York State 
Division of Housing and Community Renewal, for the purpose of 
removing approximately 50 attorneys and hearing officers from 
that unit. 
The showing of interest presented by petitioners in 
support of their decertification petition was drawn only from 
among those 50 persons the petitioners seek to remove from 
the overall unit. Because the decertification petition was 
not supported by a showing of interest of at least 30 percent 
of the persons in the existing unit, the Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation (Director) dismissed 
the petition pursuant to §201.3(d) of our Rules of Procedure. 
Section 201.3(d) of our Rules provides as follows: 
A petition for certification or decertifi-
cation may be filed within thirty days before 
the expiration . . . of the period of 
unchallenged representation status accorded a 
recognized or certified employee organi-
zation. Unless filed by a public employer, 
such a petition shall be supported by a 
showing of interest of at least 30% of the 
employees in the unit already in existence or 
alleged to be appropriate by the petitioner. 
In their exceptions, petitioners claim that the Director 
misconstrues the language of §201.3(d) of our Rules by 
finding that a petition for decertification may only be 
accompanied by a showing of interest of 30 percent of the 
employees in the existing unit, and may not be accompanied by 
Board - C-3272 
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a showing of interest of at least 30 percent of the employees 
in the unit alleged to be appropriate by the petitioner. 
Petitioners contend that it is they who have the choice of 
determining what shall be the composition of the unit for the 
purpose of establishing what constitutes a 30 percent showing 
of interest. We disagree. 
Section 201.3(d) of our Rules has. from the time of its 
promulgation, been interpreted and construed to mean that a 
petition for certification must be accompanied by a showing 
of interest of at least 30 percent of the employees in the 
unit alleged by the petitioner to be appropriate. On the 
other hand, a petition for decertification must be 
accompanied by a showing of interest of at least 30 percent 
2/ 
of the employees in the existing unit.— 
A petitioner seeking only decertification of an existing 
unit does not. contrary to the contention of the petitioners 
in the instant case, have the opportunity to select which of 
two options it will exercise in order to establish the size 
3/ 
of the showing of interest required.— This absence of 
•^'As to public employers who file decertification 
petitions, because no showing of interest is required, the 
composition of the unit is irrelevant to our inquiry here. 
See §201.3(d) of our Rules. 
•^See. e.g.. State of New York. Unified Court System. 
15 PERB 1P038 (1982). 
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options is borne out by a review of §201.5(a) and (b) of our 
Rules, which enumerate the facts and information necessary to 
the filing of a petition for certification and 
decertification respectively. Section 201.5(a)(3) requires 
that a petition for certification be accompanied by a 
"description of the negotiating unit which the petitioner 
claims to be appropriate" and subsection (6) calls for the 
"number of employees in the allegedly appropriate unit". 
while §201.5(b)(7) requires that a petition for 
decertification be accompanied by a "description of the unit, 
including the number of employees". Clearly, only in the 
case of certification is the showing of interest keyed to 
\ the unit claimed to be appropriate by the petitioner. 
J 
Petitions which only seek decertification focus solely on the 
size of the existing unit. 
Inasmuch as the petitioners seek decertification of 
DC 37 as the bargaining representative of an already existing 
unit, a 30 percent showing of interest taken from among the 
employees in the entire unit is required by our Rules. It is 
uncontroverted that the showing of interest presented in 
support of the decertification petition is numerically 
inadequate when based upon the existing unit of approximately 
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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the petition be. and it 
hereby is. dismissed in its entirety. 
DATED: January 28. 1988 
New York, New York 
iM? R. A£J 
arold R. Newman. Chairman 
/jtA&z./? 
Walter L. Eisenberg. Membe 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
JOSEPH WERNER, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-9182 
MIDDLE COUNTRY TEACHERS ASSOCIATION. 
Respondent. 
JOSEPH WERNER, pro se 
JAMES R. SANDNER. ESQ. (CHRISTOPHER MEAGHER. ESQ.. 
of Counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of Joseph 
Werner, charging party, to the dismissal, as untimely, of his 
improper practice charge against the Middle Country Teachers 
Association (Association). The Administrative Law Judge 
(ALJ) found that Werner's claim, that the Association's 
agency shop fee refund procedure for 1986-87 violated 
§209-a.2(a) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act 
(Act), is time barred because the acts or omissions 
complained of in the charge occurred more than four months 
before its filing (§204.1(a)(1) of our Rules of Procedure). 
In his charge. Werner alleges that he is an agency shop 
fee payer and that in June 1986. he received a copy of the 
11426 
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Association's agency shop fee refund procedure for the 
1986-87 fiscal year.— Pursuant to the procedure. Werner 
filed objections to the use of his agency shop fees for 
impermissible purposes under the Act and, on September 5. 
1986. he received an advance reduction payment from the 
Association, together with financial information in 
justification of the amount and means of calculating the 
payment. Thereafter, on October 15, 1986. Werner made a lump 
sum agency shop fee payment for the entire 1986-87 fiscal 
year, and included on his check the following restrictive 
endorsement: "~ 
This check is to be held in escrow by [the 
Association] and not cashed until the release to 
Joseph Werner of an indepth accounting of where the 
[Association's] Officers Expense Account ($21,300) 
and the [Association's] Representatives Expense 
Account ($13,138.60) has been spent. 
On December 1. 1986. the Association notified Werner 
that it would not send him any further financial information, 
and thereafter cashed his check without placing the funds in 
escrow. On January 8, 1987. Werner filed his improper 
practice charge, alleging that: 
!/section 208.3(b) of the Act authorizes the 
negotiation of agency shop fees equivalent to membership 
dues, but requires the establishment and maintenance of a 
refund procedure for the return of an employee's pro rata 
share of expenditures by the bargaining representative "in 
aid of activities or causes of a political or ideological 
nature only incidentally related to terms and conditions of 
employment." 
11427 
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1. He had not been provided with adequate 
audited financial disclosure in a timely-
manner ; 
2. The Association had not properly justified 
how its advance reduction was calculated; 
3. The refund procedure compels Werner to file 
objections prior to receiving adequate 
financial information upon which objections 
can be based; 
4. The procedure contains no provision requiring 
the creation of an escrow account in which 
agency fees in dispute are placed; 
5. The procedure contains no provision for a 
final "end stage" decision at the conclusion 
of the fiscal year; 
6. The procedure requires the filing of 
objections by certified or registered mail 
only. 
Werner alleges that these acts or omissions on the part 
of the Association violate §209-a.2(a) and §208.3(b) of the 
Act and are in contravention of the decision of the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson, 106 S.Ct. 
1066. 19 PERB 1F7502 (1986). 
The ALJ found, however, that in applying the four-month 
limitation period applicable to the filing of improper 
practice charges, all of the allegations contained in the 
charge were untimely. In reaching this conclusion, the ALJ 
found that the alleged failure to provide Werner with 
adequate audited financial disclosure and with adequate 
justification of how the advance reduction was calculated 
occurred on September 5. 1986, when the advance reduction 
11428 
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determination was received by Werner. That date. 
September 5, was also the date of receipt of the allegedly 
inadequate justification, which, so the ALJ found, was the 
point when that act or omission complained took place. 
Because the charge was not filed until January 8, 1987. more 
than four months later, it was time barred. With respect to 
the remaining claims made by Werner, that the refund 
procedure was deficient on its face, the ALJ found that the 
act or omission complained of occurred when Werner was placed 
on notice of the existence of the procedure. Since Werner 
received a copy of the refund procedure in June 1986, the 
charge, insofar as it alleges deficiencies in the procedure 
itself, was found by the ALJ, on its face, to be time barred. 
The question before us is what acts or omissions begin 
the running of the limitations period. Werner contends, 
first, that the limitation period should begin to run from 
the date of refusal by the Association to provide additional 
financial information rather than the date from which the 
allegedly inadequate financial information was given to him 
and, second, with respect to his claim concerning the failure 
to set up an escrow account, he asserts either that the 
failure constitutes a continuing violation, or that the 
limitation period began to run on or about October 15. 1986, 
when the Association received his agency shop fee and failed 
to escrow any portion of it. 
11429 
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The Association contends, on the other hand, that the 
ALJ correctly found that the appropriate period for 
challenging facial aspects of the procedure is within four 
months after a copy of the procedure is received and that 
claims of a failure to provide adequate information 
concerning the basis for an advanced reduction payment is 
within four months of the date when the allegedly inadequate 
information is received, making all aspects of Werner's 
charge untimely. 
With reference to the aspects of the charge relating to 
the failure to justify adequately the advance reduction 
payment, we find, as urged by the Association, that the 
limitation period begins to run from the date of receipt of 
the allegedly inadequate information, and not from the date 
of rejection of a subsequent demand for more information. To 
the extent that the charge alleges, therefore, that the 
justification for the advance reduction payment was 
inadequate or not properly audited, it is time barred, having 
been filed more than four months from the date of receipt of 
the allegedly inadequate information. 
With respect to that portion of the charge which alleges 
that certain aspects of the procedure are on their face 
violative of the Act. certainly the point from which the 
limitation period can be computed is that point at which the 
charging party learns of the existence of the allegedly 
11430 
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invalid procedure. However, the result of this computation 
would be that an agency fee payer who may have already 
decided to object as well as the one who may not yet have 
decided to do so, would both be compelled to file a charge 
within four months of receipt of the procedure, and. 
possibly, before even knowing whether the aspect of the 
procedure being challenged has any personal applicability. 
Additionally, to begin tolling the limitation period from the 
date of the receipt of the procedure would compel agency fee 
payers to discount the possibility that the employee 
organization may choose in the future to interpret the 
procedure in a manner which might circumvent his or her 
concern. On the other hand, early filing and disposition of 
improper practice charges affords a greater opportunity for 
corrective action and prospective relief, while late filing 
of charges may limit the scope of relief to the charging 
party and not to agency fee payers generally, since class 
charges of improper practice are not authorized by our Rules. 
In our view, to run the four-month limitation period 
only from the date of notice of the agency shop fee procedure 
is unduly restrictive and narrow. In addition, it would also 
be appropriate to permit the filing of an improper practice 
charge within four months after sustaining the claimed injury. 
This approach is one which this Board at one time 
approved. In City of Yonkers. 7 PERB ir3007 (1974), it held: 
11431 
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The Taylor Law violation, if any. was a 
failure to negotiate in good faith. It 
would have been perpetrated when the City of 
Yonkers unilaterally decided to withdraw an 
employee benefit during the course of 
negotiations, or when it did first actually 
withdraw such benefit ....(at 3011) 
Although subsequent Board decisions have not generally 
2/ followed the principle outlined in City of Yonkers.— upon 
reexamination, we find the "announcement" or "time-of-injury" 
principle to be more reasonable and will apply it to all 
computations of the limitation period, for charges that 
involve agency shop fee refund procedure. Moreover, we now 
find it reasonable to extend this principle generally to 
charges before PERB under our Statute. 
This approach, computing the period from date of notice 
and/or from date of actual application or injury, is a 
familiar one in contract law. Thus, where a party to a 
contract places the other party on notice of intent to 
repudiate the contract. 
The promisee may elect to treat the 
repudiation of the obligation by the other 
party as an immediate breach and bring action 
at once or he may elect to await the time when 
the contract is to be performed according to 
its terms and then hold the promisor liable 
for all the consequences of nonperformance. 
The rule is that where the action for breach 
of contract is brought after the time fixed 
for performance, notwithstanding there has 
been an anticipatory breach, the period of 
limitation runs, not from the time of such 
breach, but from the time fixed for 
performance. (Carmody-Waite 2d §13:154 at 
p.527, citing Ga Nun v. Palmer. 202 N.Y.483.) 
2/see, e.g.. County of Monroe, 10 PERB 1f3104 (1977). 
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Similarly, with reference to the discharge of a 
probationary public employee, the statute of limitations for 
filing an Article 78 proceeding has been found to run from 
the effective date of the termination, and the employee is 
not required to bring his Article 78 proceeding within four 
months of the date of notice of his termination. See, e.g.. 
Vasbinder v. Hartnett. 129 A.D.2d 894. citing DeMilio v. 
Borghard. 55 N.Y.2d 216, and Matter of Edelman v. Axelrod. 
Ill A.D.2d 468. 469. 
Finally, a case recently decided by the National Labor 
Relations Board is noteworthy with respect to the computation 
of the limitation of time for filing unfair labor practices 
alleging a breach of the duty of fair representation. In 
Arvin Automotive and United Automobile. Aerospace and 
Agricultural Implement Workers Union. Local 759. 1987-88 CCH 
NLRB iri9,044. decided December 23. 1987, the NLRB considered 
the application of the six-month limitation period contained 
in §10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act in the context 
of a claim that a union and an employer unlawfully maintained 
and enforced provisions in a collective bargaining agreement 
which granted superseniority to certain union officers for 
purposes of layoff and shift preference. The employer and 
union argued that the charge was untimely because it was not 
commenced within six months of execution of the allegedly 
unlawful agreement. The NLRB declined to so rule, and held 
11433 
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that the charging party properly filed his charge within six 
months after he was adversely affected by the application of 
the superseniority clause, which resulted in a shop steward 
bumping him from his shift. 
Although we are mindful of the fact that our holding in 
this case represents a departure from at least some of the 
cases previously decided by this Board, our experience has 
demonstrated that to compel a "rush to judgment" approach is 
not always in the best interest of the employer, employee 
organization or employee. Rather, by allowing for an 
opportunity to rethink and change, a better labor climate may 
be provided for resolving the matter without the need for 
\ litigation. In cases raising, for example, allegations of a 
J 
failure to negotiate in good faith, a breach of the duty of 
fair representation, or a discriminatory discharge, a party 
has standing to file an improper practice charge within four 
months after notification of a decision to perform an action 
alleged to be violative of the Act. The party may also await 
performance of the action and file an improper practice 
charge within four months after the intended action is 
actually implemented and the charging party is injured 
thereby. 
Applying this principle to the instant case, the portion 
of the charge which alleges that the agency shop fee refund 
procedure fails to provide for the creation of an escrow 
) 
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account is timely, since not more than four months have 
elapsed from its application to Werner and his filing of the 
charge. 
The portion of the charge which alleges a failure to 
provide for a final "end stage" decision at the conclusion of 
the fiscal year is time barred since it was not filed within 
four months of issuance of the procedure, and is premature 
since, as of the date of filing of the charge. Werner had not 
yet been affected by the omission. As to the portions of the 
charge alleging that the Association did not properly justify 
how its advance reduction was calculated, that the procedure 
requires the filing of objections prior to receiving adequate 
financial information upon which objections can be based and 
that it requires the filing of objections by certified or 
registered mail only, they are untimely. These matters were 
applied to Werner more than four months prior to the filing 
of the charge. Those aspects of the charge are accordingly 
dismissed. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that: 
1. Allegations of the charge numbered 1, 2, 3 and 6 are 
dismissed as untimely; 
2. Allegation number 5, which relates to a final "end 
stage" decision is dismissed without prejudice to the 
filing of a new charge, if then timely, when and if 
Werner is denied an "end stage" decision at the 
conclusion of the 1986-87 fiscal year; and 
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3. The remainder of the charge, insofar as it relates to 
the failure to create an escrow account, is remanded 
to the Director for further proceedings on its merits. 
DATED: January 28. 1988 
New York, New York 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
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